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Summary findings
In theory, market failures are necessary but not sufficient  markets and imperfect information  are pervasive:
conditions for justifying government intervention in the  Markets are almost always incomplete, and information
production  of goods and services. Even without market  is always imperfect.
failures, there might be a case for government  This does not mean that there is always a case for
intervention on the grounds of poverty reduction or  government intervention and that further analysis is
merit goods (for example, mandatory elementary  unnecessary. On the contrary, there is a keener need for
education and mandatory use of seatbelts in cars and of  analysis. The welfare consequences of the "new market
helmets on motorbikes)  failures" are more difficult to measure so government
In every case, contends Belli, a case for government  intervention's contribution  to welfare is likely to be more
intervention must first identify the particular market  difficult to assess and the case for intervention  (especiatly
failure that prevents the private sector from producing  the provision of goods and services) is more difficult to
the socially optimal quantity of the good or service.  make.
Second, it must select the intervention that will most  One must also keep in mind that government
improve welfare. Third, it must show that society will be  interventions are often poorly designed and overcostly.
better off as a result of government involvement - must  Poorly designed interventions may create market failures
show that the benefits will outweigh the costs.  of their own. Governments concerned about low private
It is impossible to judge a priori whether or what type  investment in high-risk projects, for example, may
of government intervention is appropriate to a particular  guarantee them against risk but in the process create
circumstance or even to a class of situations. Such  problems of moral hazard and induce investors to take
judgments are both country- and situation-specific and  no actions to mitigate such risks.
must be made on a case-by-case basis.  And some interventions may turn out to be too costly
To be sure, it is easier to make such judgments about  relative to the posited benefits. In seeking to provide
market failures based on externalities, public goods, and  extension services, for example, governments may incur
so on, than about the market failures based on imperfect  costs that are higher than the benefits farmers receive.
information. Market failures rooted in incomplete
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The important  thingfor government  is not to do things which
individuals  are doing already  and to do them a little better  or a
little worse:  but to do those  things which  are not done at all.
J. M. Keynes, "The End of Laissez-Faire"
1.  Worldwide, the private sector is increasingly providing goods and services that a few
decades ago were deemed to be properly in the domain of the public sector. Several reasons
account for the shrinking role of government in this regard. First, the economic development
paradigm no longer considers it appropriate for governments to act as entrepreneurs. Second, an
inconclusive, albeit growing, body of evidence indicates that the public sector tends to use funds
less efficiently than the private sector when engaged in market-oriented activities. I Third,
technological changes are making it possible to have competition in markets that traditionally
have been considered natural monopolies. Is there still a justification for public provision of
goods and services, or should the private sector be the sole provider?
2.  The economic answer depends partially on whether a country's welfare is likely to
increase more if the public rather than the private sector is the provider. In turn, this depends on
a host of conditions that vary from country to country and, within a particular country, from year
to year: for example, institutional arrangements; legal, regulatory, and political conditions; and
external circumstances. In addition to economic considerations, there are distributional, political
and strategic considerations. Consequently, there are no hard and fast rules by which to conclude
unmistakably that one or the other sector is the appropriate provider-in the end this decision is
largely a matter of judgment.2 This paper reviews the main arguments for public intervention in
the provision of goods and services and shows how the traditional tools of economic analysis of
projects can shed light on this important question.
General Considerations
3.  Why should governments be involved in the provision of any good whatsoever? As far
back as 1776, Adam Smith argued in The Wealth of Nations that in competitive markets, an
individual pursuing private gains would promote the common good:
He intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand
to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for society that
it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more*
effectually than when he really intends to promote it.
There are no theoretical grounds for supposing  that private sector enterprises are more efficient than public
enterprises,  nor is there conclusive  evidence  showing  that one is more efficient than the other. Examples of
efficiency  and inefficiency  can be found in both sectors. Yet even those economists  who make  strong cases for
government  intervention  side with the popular  notion that public enterprises  are less efficient (see, for example,
Stiglitz,  1994,  p. 237).
2  In the context of Bank work, the initial  justification  for public  provision  ought to stem from an analysis of the
country's public  expenditure  program  and,  should  be justified  in the Country  Assistance  Strategy.2
In the 1950s Arrow (195 la) and Debreu (1959) formalized Adam Smith's insight in what are
now known as the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics. The first theorem says that
under certain conditions every competitive equilibrium is Pareto-efficient-that  is, in an
economy that reaches a competitive equilibrium, no one can be made better off without making
someone else worse off. The second theorem says that under certain conditions every Pareto-
efficient allocation of resources can be obtained through a decentralized market mechanism.
These theorems are relevant to any discussion of the role of government in resource allocation:
they imply that under the conditions assumed by Arrow and Debreu, no government or central
planner, however omniscient and well-intentioned, can improve on the results obtained by the
free market system. The best of all possible planners might do as well as competitive firms
attempting to maximize their own profits, but they would never do better. This point is especially
relevant for project analysis because under the ideal conditions posited by Arrow and Debreu, a
project's net benefits from an investor's perspective would give an exact measure of the net
benefits from society's perspective. The economic and financial evaluation of a project would
yield exactly the same result.
4.  If the real world fulfilled the assumptions of the fundamental theorems of welfare
economics, the market would produce every good in demand and there would be no need for
governments to provide any good or service. Equity considerations, then, would be the only
economic justification for government intervention. However, the real world, is a far cry from
the idealized Arrow-Debreu world. In many cases private markets fail to produce the socially
optimal quantities of goods and services and, in principle, govermnent intervention can enhance
welfare.
5.  Market failures (departures from the ideal conditions posited by Arrow and Debreu)
occur because (a) competition is imperfect (someone may have monopoly power, for example);
(b) producers may impose a cost or confer a benefit to other producers (or consumers) without
paying for the cost or charging for the benefit (that is, there are externalities); (c) the process
produces a "public good" for which it is impossible or undesirable to levy a charge; (d) markets
are incomplete (they do not extend infinitely far into the future and they do not cover all risks);
or (e) information is incomplete and imperfect. There is an a priori rationale for public sector
involvement whenever the market cannot or will not produce the socially desirable quantity of
the good or service. But the public sector should be the residual provider of goods, intervening
only when the market does not produce the socially optimal quantity of the good or service.
6.  The nature of government involvement, however, merits careful consideration. In some
cases it may be appropriate for the government to produce goods (roads, for example); in others,
financing production of the service might be just more advisable (primary education, for
example); in yet others, a subsidy might be the most suitable intervention (subsidizing a forest
that sequesters carbon dioxide, or the access of poor people to safe water, for example). In all
cases, the analyst must ask three fundamental questions: (a) What market failure leads the
private sector to produce more or less than the socially optimal quantity of this good or service?
(b) What sort of government intervention is appropriate to ensure that the optimal quantity is
produced? and (c) Is the recommended government intervention likely to have the desired
impact? If there is a strong case for government intervention, we must assess the costs and
benefits of government involvement and show that the benefits are likely to outweigh the costs.
We cannot assume that government bureaucrats will succeed where markets fail. Government
interventions, often poorly designed and implemented, may create more problems than they
solve. The rest of this paper will review some of the most common market failures and the
rationale for public intervention in each case. At the end of the paper we will also discuss two3




7.  Natural monopolies  provide  one of the oldest  justifications  for government  provision  of
goods  and services.  Adam Smith's invisible  hand works well only in competitive  markets.  In
many  markets  competition  does not exist, and in others  competition  is inefficient.  Some
production  processes  enjoy  economies  of scale;  that is, unit costs  of production  fall as output
rises. A common  example  is the supply  of electricity:  in densely  populated  regions, it is more
efficient  to supply  electricity  through  an integrated  network  than for every  household  to have its
own generator.  When  economies  of scale  are present,  large firms produce  more cheaply  than
small firms and tend to dominate  their markets;  eventually  they  may drive smaller  firms into
bankruptcy  and, in extreme  cases,  may become  monopolies.  Industries  in which the conditions  of
demand  and supply  are such  that production  by a single  firm  minimizes  costs are known  as a
natural monopolies.  Unregulated  monopolies  of any kind, natural or not, tend  to charge  too much
and produce  too little. Whenever  natural  monopolies  are present,  government  intervention,  at
least in principle,  can lead to more  production  at a lower  price.
8.  What  kind of intervention  is appropriate?  The first alternative  is to do nothing.  This
solution  might  be optimal  when the product  or service  has close  substitutes  and monopoly  power
is weak, that is, when the ability  to charge  prices  that result in excess  profits is insignificant.  In
the case  of cable television,  for example,  the presence  of close substitutes  reduces  the monopoly
power  of cable providers  enough  to obviate  govermnent  intervention.  Before  deciding  that some
form of government  intervention  is called  for, we need to assess the welfare  losses  from the
exercise  of monopoly  power.  For a methodology  for estimating  the welfare  losses  from
monopoly,  see Harberger's  (1954)  seminal  article, and  the extension  by Cowling  and Mueller
(1978).  Ferguson  (1988)  provides  a summary  of several  studies  on the subject.3
9.  The traditional  solution  in many  countries  has been  to have a public  enterprise  provide
the good or service.  In many  countries  electricity  is publicly  provided,  and many water
companies  around  the world  are public enterprises.  The assumption  has been that a public
enterprise  would maximize  social rather  than private  welfare.  To induce  public  enterprises  to
maximize  social welfare  is extremely  difficult  because  social  welfare  is tough to measure  and
hence so is the performance  of managers  of public  enterprises.  Therefore,  we must usually  use
proxies  that at best are imperfect  substitutes.  As a result,  what managers  of public enterprises
maximize  is not necessarily  welfare,  but something  else. Peltzman  (1971)  postulated  that
managers  of public enterprises  maximize  political support.  His  theory predicts  that public
enterprises  will set a price  below the profit-maximizing  price,  voters will pay lower  prices than
nonvoters,  and public  enterprises  will use less price discrimination  than private firms. Evidence
from developed  countries  supports  Peltzman's  theory  and shows  that public enterprises  tend to
charge  lower prices  than regulated  private  monopolies,  practice  less price discrimination,  and
adjust rates less frequently  (Peltzman,  1971,  Moore 1970).
3  It should  be noted that technological  advances  are making  it possible  to have competitive  markets  in areas  that in
the past were considered  natural  monopolies  (telecommunications,  for example).4
10.  Another  traditional  solution  has been  to have a private, but regulated,  enterprise  provide
the good  or service.  In some  countries,  telephone  companies  are private,  regulated  monopolies.
Regulation  itself  has benefits  and costs.  The benefits  are  the reduction  in deadweight  losses  in
efficiency  that would  exist under monopoly.  The  costs include  the direct costs  of regulatory
agencies,  higher  production  costs  because  of changed  incentives  for regulated  firms, and
unintended  side effects  of regulation.  For regulation  to be effective,  the regulatory  agency  must
induce  the firm  to provide  the good  or service  at average  cost pricing,  which in turn requires  that
it have cost and demand  information.  For a discussion  of the costs  and benefits  of regulation,  see
Viscusi,  Vernon,  and Harrington  (1966).
11.  A solution  that is becoming  more  common  is to auction  off the franchise  to private
firms. The franchise  is awarded  via competitive  bidding  to the firm that offers to provide  a given
quality  of service at the lowest  price.  In theory,  a large  number  of bidders  drives the price down
to the point where  the eventual  provider  earns a normal  return.  Franchise  bidding  should  thus
avoid  the need for regulation  while  achieving  the same  result.  In practice,  franchise  bidding  has
been much more  complex,  and it is not at all clear that it has generated  socially  desirable
solutions.  Viscusi,  Vernon,  and Harrington  (1996)  provide  a good  review  of experience  in the
United States.
12.  Which  is the preferred  solution  for dealing  with natural  monopolies-a regulated  private
firm,  a public  enterprise,  or franchise  bidding?  It is difficult  to rank the alternatives  in order of
preference.  The  evidence  concerning  the relative  efficiency  of regulated  privately  owned  utilities
compared  to public  utilities is mixed,  though the weight  of the evidence  points to greater
efficiency  in regulated  private enterprises  (Moore, 1970;  DiLorenzo  and Robinson,  1982).  The
experience  with franchise  bidding  in the United States  indicates  that govermnent  quickly  turns
from mere auctioneer  to regulator.  Nevertheless,  because  franchise  bidding  provides  a greater
role for competitive  forces, it is the most promising.
Externalities
13.  Externalities  provide  another  traditional  argument  for government  intervention.
Sometimes  activities  generate  benefits  and costs  that are not reflected  in the benefits  and costs of
the firm.  A forest, for example,  may lower  the level of carbon  dioxide  in the world,  but the
owner  of the forest-who  bears the full cost of planting  and maintaining  the forest-cannot
charge  for this benefit. As a result,  the forest  may be smaller  than desirable  from the world's
point  of view. In some other cases,  a project  may use resources  for which it does not pay.
Consequently  it may produce  more  than is socially  desirable.  An irrigation  project, for example,
may lead  to reduced  fish catch downstream.  The project's effect on the downstream  fisheries  are
costs  to society  that are not reflected  in the project's accounts.  This discrepancy  between  private
and social costs leads  to a larger scale of irrigation  than is socially  desirable.  Externalities  are
among  the principal  justifications  given  for public  involvement  in the provision  of education
services  and prevention  of communicable  diseases.
14.  Government  can intervene  in various  ways to induce  firms to produce  the socially
optimal  quantity  of goods  whose  production  process  is subject  to externalities.  Again, if the
magnitude  of the externality  is insignificant  one alternative  is to do nothing.  Automobiles  have
been polluting  the air since  they were invented,  but the problem  did not become serious  until
automobiles  became  numerous.  Another  solution  is to regulate.  The Clean Air Act in the United
States,  for example,  sets ambient  quality  standards  irrespective  of cost considerations.  A third
solution  is to tax the producer  of negative  externalities  to discourage  their production  and to5
subsidize  the producer  of positive  externalities  to encourage  their production.  The Global
Environmental  Facility  funds production  of goods  and services  that reduce  global  environmental
externalities,  for example.
15  Conceptually,  at least, optimal  solutions  can be reached  through  taxes and subsidies.
Figure 1 shows  the market for good  X. The  production  of this good  is subject  to an externality
that increases  the social cost of production  (SMC) above  the private  cost (PMC).  The marginal
benefit  of good X is given  by the demand  curve.  Without  government  intervention,  the market
will produce  Q units as compared  to the optimal  quantity  Q* and the optimal  price P*. An
optimal  tax equal  to P* - P would raise  the price of X to P* and induce  production  of Q* units.
Instead  of a tax, the government  could  impose  a quota  to limit  production  of X to Q* units.
Eventually  the market will drive  the price of X up to P*. Government  could  also intervene  by
producing  good X and limiting  its output  to Q*.  If the externality  were positive,  the position  of
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FIGuRE 1.  MARKET SOLUTION  VS. SOCIAL  OPTIMUM  wHEN EXTERNALITIES  ARE  PRESENT
Public Goods
16.  The third traditional  argument  for public  provision  concerns  the nature  of the goods  and
services  themselves.  All goods  provided  by the private sector  share  one important  feature,6
namely,  that the provider  of the good  can charge  those who wish  to consume  it and make a profit
in the process.  Not all goods,  however,  share this characteristic.  There is a broad category of
goods  called  public  goods  for which it is either impossible  or undesirable  to charge.  The private
sector  usually  shies  away from producing  public  goods;  or if it does  produce  them, it usually
charges  too much  and produces  too little  of them. For example,  cleaning  up the air in Mexico
City  would be of great  benefit to the city,  but no private sector  company  would do it because  it
could not charge  for the service.
17.  Exclusion  difficult  or costly. Some  public  goods  are not produced  by private markets
because  it is impossible  to prevent  anyone  from consuming  them, even if they do not want to pay
for them. These  public  goods  are called  nonexcludable  goods.  Consider  national  defense.  If an
army succeeds  in defending  the national  territory  against  an enemy,  every  citizen benefits,
whether  he/she  paid to sustain  the army  or not. Similarly,  spraying  an area to rid it of malaria-
carrying  mosquitoes  benefits  every  nearby  inhabitant,  but it is difficult,  to charge everyone  for
the service.  Those  who refuse to pay for spraying  will get a free ride.  If a sufficiently  large
number  refuse to pay, spraying  may not take place. Because  of these difficulties,  the private
sector  will not usually  produce  nonexcludable  public goods  (or will produce  suboptimal
quantities).  Public  production  of nonexcludable  public goods  has been  considered  to enhance
public welfare  and therefore  to be a proper function  of government.
18.  In some cases exclusion  is possible,  but costly.  Roads  are nonexcludable,  but toll roads
are excludable.  The costs associated  with limited-access  roads,  however,  are considerably  higher
than those of normal  roads: exclusion  comes  at a high cost. Whenever  a project produces  a good
for which  the cost of exclusion  is high,  there is also a strong  presumption  for public  provision.
19.  Nonrival  goods  (exclusion  undesirable  or inefficient).  Private  goods  also share another
important  characteristic,  namely  that the marginal  cost of consumption  is high. In the case of
nonrival  public  goods,  however,  the marginal  cost of consumption  is zero or very low.  Although
private production  of nonrival  goods  is possible,  the private  sector  will produce  suboptimal
quantities.  Socially  optimal  pricing  requires  that the price of goods  or services  be equal to the
marginal  cost of consumption.  If the price is set to equal  marginal  cost, private provision  may be
unprofitable.  Once a bridge  is built, for example,  the marginal  cost of letting  another  car use it is
virtually  zero (up to the point  of congestion).  For an uncongested  bridge,  optimal  pricing  would
require  a very low toll, too low to recover  the initial investment  and hence  too low  to interest the
private sector.  If the toll were set high enough  to interest  the private  sector,  too few cars would
use the bridge.  Likewise,  the cost of informing  one thousand  consumers  over the air waves is the
same  as the cost of informing  two thousand,  and the information  available  to a thousand
additional  consumers  does not reduce  the amount  available  to others:  the marginal  cost of
consumption  is zero.  Whenever  the marginal  cost of consumption  is zero or extremely  low, it is
undesirable  to use the price system  to ration  the good,  as efficiency  requires  that goods  and
services  be provided  at the marginal  cost of providing  them. The  private sector,  which would
charge  more  than the marginal  cost of provision,  would  provide  suboptimal  amounts  of these
goods.  Low marginal  cost of consumption  is often used as an argument  for public provision  of
research  and extension,  utility  services,  and public information  services  (agricultural  prices and
weather  patterns).  The  argument  for public involvement  in the provision  of nonrival  public
goods is strong,  but the nature  of the involvement  need  not be provision  of the good,  as provision
of funding  may be optimal  in many cases.  For example,  the optimal  quantity  of research  and
extension  services  may be achieved  with public  funding of  private provision.
20.  Some  goods  are both nonexcludable  and nonrival.  National  defense,  for example,  is both
nonexcludable  and nonrival:  the cost of protecting  a given  territory  against  foreign  invaders  is7
the same, whether the inhabitants of the territory amount to one or two million. Pure public
goods are both nonexcludable and nonrival. Private goods, say shoes, are both excludable and
rival. In between these two extremes, there is a host of goods that may be only partially
nonexcludable or partially nonrival. Information and technology, for example, are nonrival and
partially nonexcludable goods. The provider of pure public goods incurs all the costs but reaps
none of the benefits, the provider of private goods incurs all of the costs and (except for taxes)
reaps all of the benefits.  1 As general rule, there is no economic justification for public provision
of private goods in competitive markets.
21.  Figure 2 shows the ease of exclusion along the horizontal axis and the cost of exclusion
(marginal cost of consumption) on the vertical axis. Pure public goods appear in the lower left-
hand corner. These goods are nonexcludable and nonrival. Pure private goods appear in the
upper right-hand corner, where the marginal cost of consumption is equal, or nearly equal, to the
average cost, and the cost of exclusion is low. Impure public goods are only partially excludable
or partially nonrival. A bridge is an example of an impure public good. Once built, it is relatively
simple to exclude anyone from using it, but because the marginal cost of an additional
automobile crossing is low (up to the point of congestion), it is not socially desirable to charge a
fee that exceeds the marginal cost. A crowded limited-access highway is an example where
exclusion is easy, but where the marginal social cost of a vehicle entering might be very high.
High marginal cost of  Pure
consumption  *  private
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FIGURE  2:  PURE  IMPURE  PUBLIC  GOODS 5
4  That  is,  only  if the  production  of the  good  is not  subject  to externalities.
5  After  Stiglitz  (1988).8
22.  Many Bank projects finance public goods. A difference between a project that produces
private goods and one that produces public goods is the distribution of costs and benefits among
various groups in society. In the case of private goods, the benefits (save for taxes) as well as the
costs accrue to the project entity. In the case of public goods, the project entity incurs the costs
but society at large enjoys the benefits.
23.  The very nature of public goods implies that there are no markets for them, and hence it
is difficult to value the benefits of producing them. As the Bank's business moves away from
financing the production of private goods to financing the production of public goods, the
traditional tools of economic analysis need to be extended to evaluate the benefits of goods and
services for which there are no ready markets. In some cases (roads, for example) the tools are
well developed, in other cases (health, for example) they are controversial, and in yet others
(environment) they are rudimentary. Table I shows in schematic form a hypothetical distribution
of costs and benefits for a pure public good.
Table 1: Hypothetical Distribution of Costs and Benefits of a Public Good
Project Entity  Government  Others  Society
Benefits  0  0  150  150
Costs  (80)  0  (80)
Net benefits  (80)  0  150  70
Subsidies  80  (80)  0  0
Total  0  (80)  150  70
24.  In this case the provider incurs all of the costs but does not receive a monetary reward
for any of the benefits because it cannot charge for them. The benefits accrue to the country at
large, or "others." The provider needs to be subsidized to survive and as a result there is a
negative fiscal impact of 80. As the last column shows, the project generates gross benefits of
150 and net benefits of 70. Note that if the project produced a private good, the economic costs
and benefits would be exactly alike. What would differ would be the distribution of benefits and
costs among the various groups in society. If we looked only at the last column, we would not be
able to tell whether the good is public or private.
25.  By exploiting the information embedded in the differences between private and social
prices and private and social flows, the tools of economic analysis of projects enable us to
construct tables showing the distribution of costs and benefits. They thus provide very valuable
information that can guide the decision to place a project in the public or in the private sector.
For an application of these techniques, see Belli, Anderson, Barnum, Dixon, and Tan, 1996.
Asymmetric Information and Incomplete Markets
26.  Perfect information, equally shared among all consumers and producers, is a basic
assumption of the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics. Another basic assumption is
the existence of complete markets (a market for every type of good and service, for every type of
risk, extending forever into the future). Neither of these assumptions is ever fulfilled.
Information is always imperfect, and markets seldom provide all goods and services for which
the cost of provision is less than what individuals are willing to pay. When information is
imperfect and markets are incomplete, the actions of individuals have externality-like effects that
result in suboptimal production of goods and services (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986).9
Information-based market failures differ from the market failures discussed above in two
important respects. First, for the most part, the former or "older" market failures are related to an
easily identifiable source, and second, they can be corrected (at least conceptually) with well-
defined government interventions. Market failures based on imperfect and costly information
and incomplete markets, on the other hand, are pervasive in the economy and difficult (if not
impossible) to correct, as nearly all markets are incomplete and information is always imperfect.
Full corrective policy would be impractical as it would entail taxes and subsidies on virtually all
commodities. We now consider some arguments for public intervention when information is
imperfect and markets are incomplete.
27.  Ignorant consumers and informed  producers. Parties to market transactions rarely share
the same information. Producers usually know more than consumers do about the product they
are selling. Bank managers and bank owners, for example, know more about the financial health
of their institutions than consumers do. Buyers of used cars usually know less about the car than
the owner and may get stuck with a lemon. Patients usually know less about how to treat a
disease than their doctor and will accept the treatment prescribed, even if there is no need for it.
Asymmetric information is pervasive. If information were complete and equally shared, more
transactions would take place as fewer parties would fear "being taken." Government
interventions that improve information flows can lead to more transactions and hence to
increased welfare. Although in principle taxes and subsidies would lead to optimal allocation of
resources and hence to improved welfare, in practice most interventions aiming at correcting
information failures do not rely on taxes and subsidies, but on the coercive power of government.
Thus, in many countries banks are required to disclose financial information, sellers are required
to disclose information about the goods they are selling to potential buyers, and there are strict
disclosure requirements for publicly traded stocks.
28.  Informed consumers and ignorant  producers. Asymmetric information also works
against producers. It is often argued, for example, that lack of information induces lenders not to
lend to certain groups, or lend at rates that cover not only costs and risks but also the lack of
information. Hence, they lend less than the social optimum. If information about the borrowers
were better, it is often argued, lenders would be willing to lend at lower rates and hence would
attract more clients.
29.  The World Bank is an example of an intervention that improves information and capital
markets. By virtue of its charter, the World Bank has access to information about its borrowers
that commercial banks do not and therefore it can assess country risks better than a commercial
bank. Because it can also influence policy, it can diminish country risks and improve the flows
of private capital into developing countries. The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh is an example of
an intervention that completes an incomplete capital market. This rural bank was created to
provide credit and organizational support to individuals who, for lack of material collateral,
would be excluded from the formal credit system. The Grameen Bank tackles the problem of
asymmetric information by lending only to small groups of self-selected individuals who are
known to one another and who monitor and provide the repayment guarantees for each other. It
tackles the enforcement problem by linking the individual's continued access to credit to the
group's  repayment record. Among other things, its proximity to its clients facilitates the flow of
information, which in turn enables it to supplement an incomplete market and improve its
efficiency.
30.  The rationale for public intervention in activities that provide information is strong.
Stiglitz (1988), argues that in many ways, information is a public good. First, it is nonrival, as
giving information to one more individual does not reduce the amount available to others.10
Second, it is largely nonexcludable, as the marginal cost of giving information to one more
individual is low and at most equal to the cost of transmitting the information. Efficiency
requires that information be given at the marginal cost of providing it. Because the marginal
costs of provision may be close to zero, the private sector, which charges more than the marginal
cost, often provides too little information. Although the case for public intervention in the
provision of information is strong, the rationale for public provision of information is weaker.
Publicly funded tornado warning services, for example, may be provided over private radio
stations; they need not be provided over public radio stations.
31.  Asymmetric information gives rise to adverse selection and moral hazard, two
problems that arise in a variety of contexts, but that are most clearly seen in the case of insurance
markets. With either problem, private markets tend to provide too little of a good or service, and
appropriate government intervention can enhance welfare.
32.  Adverse selection. It is human nature to seek protection when we are at risk and to be
less careful when we are not at risk. In any given population, some people are at higher risk than
others with respect to a certain event. Residents of California are at higher risk from earthquake
damage than residents of Virginia. As a result, Califomians generally buy earthquake insurance
and Virginians do not. If everyone in the United States purchased earthquake insurance, rates
would be lower. But buyers of insurance are not necessarily randomly selected. They are self-
selected: only those who consider themselves at risk buy insurance. From an insurance
company's viewpoint, buyers are adversely self-selected. As a result, insurance companies
charge higher premiums than they would if the selection were random. Higher premiums lead to
thinner markets. Whenever the insurance premiums are set so high as to compensate for adverse
selection, large numbers of people who would be willing to pay for the actuarially fair rate to
protect themselves from a particular risk do not buy insurance. Adverse selection has been cited
as a justification  for public intervention in, for example, the health sector. As a result of adverse
selection and ensuing high insurance premiums, many people may be left without insurance
against catastrophic illness, leading to large discrepancies between social and private benefits
(Hammer, 1996).
33.  Moral hazard. It is also human nature to be less careful when we do not have to suffer
the consequences of our own actions. Thus, we tend to speed if there is no fear of being caught.
Banks that are insured by the government against bad loans may not exercise as much care as
banks that incur the full cost of bad loans gone sour. Likewise, people who are insured against
theft may be less careful with their belongings than those who are not insured. The lack of
incentive to take care when we do not have to suffer the consequences of our own actions is
called moral hazard. In markets where moral hazard is present, too little of a certain good is
typically offered. For example, consumers would like to buy more insurance, and insurance
companies to sell it-but  only if consumers exercise due care. However, insurance companies,
cannot be sure that consumers will exercise due care, and therefore they sell less insurance than
consumers are willing to buy: they ask consumers to bear some of the risk, that is, to self-insure
and to copay. Many authors think that moral hazard problems are not a good justification for
public intervention (see, for example, Lal, 1994, and Varian, 1987), but rather a limitation of the
extent of insurance that can be provided. But Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) have shown that, in
theory, if moral hazard problems are present, governments can effect Pareto improvements by
taxing and subsidizing various commodities that induce people to take greater care. For example,
by subsidizing the use of seatbelts, the government can encourage drivers to exercise greater
care, and by taxing cigarettes and alcohol, it can discourage smoking in bed in a state of11
inebriation  and therefore  reduce  the incidence  of fires. Government  provision  of information  can
have effects  on incentives  akin to those of taxes and subsidies.
34.  Risk aversion.  The  public sector,  as representative  of a country's  entire population,  can
spread  risk over every  citizen  in the country  and is therefore  in a unique  position  as an investor.
For  this reason,  Arrow and Lind  (1970)  argued  that when governments  act as investors,  they
should  be risk-neutral,  that is neither prefer  nor avoid  risk. Governments,  Arrow and Lind
argued,  should  normally  choose  projects  on the basis of their expected  net present  value and
disregard  the variance  around the mean of the net present  value. For private investors,  who are
normally  risk-averse,  there is always  a trade-off  between  risk and return,  often expressed  as a
trade-off  between  the variance  and the mean. If problems  of moral hazard  did not exist and
insurance  markets  were complete,  private investors  would  be able to buy insurance  against
commercial  failure and undertake  riskier  projects.  But investors  cannot insure  against
commercial  failure and normally  shy away from excessively  risky  projects.  The absence  of an
insurance  market against  commercial  failure and government  risk neutrality  imply  that some
risky projects  may  be attractive  to the public sector  but not to the private  sector  (Arrow and Lind,
1970).  If a project is not attractive  to the private sector  because  it is too risky, public  provision
may be justified, even if the project produces  a private  good.
35.  Complementary  Markets.  In some cases,  the production  of a good  requires  the
production  of a complementary  good-computers and computer  programs,  for example.
Software  companies  flourished  only after  the advent  of personal  computers.  This example  of
complementary  markets  involves  only two goods.  In some cases,  many markets-and  large scale
coordination-must be involved.  Public intervention  in urban renewal  programs  and rural
development  have  been  justified on the grounds  of this market  failure. The  renewal  of a large
section  of a city or the development  of rural areas  requires  extensive  coordination  among  many
actors,  including  factories,  retailers,  landlords,  transport,  and so on. Similarly  the development  of
rural areas requires  extensive  coordination  among  various  actors.  If markets  were complete,  the
coordination  would take place through  the price system.  Incomplete  markets  require  that
someone  act as coordinator.
36.  Cost of Capital.  In a perfect and undistorted  capital  market,  the market rate of interest
would reflect  the cost of capital  to a country:  on the demand  side, the market  rate of interest
would be equal to the marginal  productivity  of capital,  and on the supply  side, it would be equal
to the rate of time preference  for consumption.  Taxes,  however,  drive  a wedge  between  the
private  and the social  opportunity  cost of capital.  On  the demand  side, the private after-tax  return
is lower than the social return,  that is, lower  than the marginal  productivity  of capital in the
private sector.  On the supply  side, also because  of taxes,  the marginal  return  to savers is lower
than the social  return,  that is, lower  than the rate of time preference  for consumption.  The  cost of
capital  to the public sector  then, viewed  as the weighted  average  of the social  marginal
productivity  of capital  in the private sector  and the social  rate of time preference  for
consumption,  is usually  higher  than the private cost of capital.  Under  certain  circumstances,
however,  the cost of capital  to the private sector  might  be higher  than  the cost of capital  to
society.  For example,  the public sector  may  have access  to low-cost  sources  of funds, say IDA,
while the private sector  may not. When  the private  sector  looks at a project,  therefore,  it may use
a higher discount  rate than the public sector  and reject projects  with, for example,  long gestation
periods.  For these reasons,  some  projects  that may be highly  beneficial  to society  may  not be
attractive  to private investors.  In these cases, government  intervention,  through  provision  or
subsidies,  can improve  welfare.12
37.  Size of the Project. The size  and strategic  nature of the project  may be another
justification  for public provision.  The  public sector,  as the representative  of a country's entire
population,  can command  more  resources  than any single  private sector  entity and can thus
undertake  large, strategic  projects  that require  capital  investments  that are beyond  the financial
reach of the private sector.  Sometimes  large projects  may  be attractive  to foreign  investors,  but
many countries  are reluctant  to allow foreign  ownership  of strategic  resources.  Public  provision
may be justified even  if the project  produces  a private good,  when  the nature  and size of the
project are such that the domestic  private sector  would  not be able to undertake  it.
Other Grounds for Public Intervention
Poverty Reduction
38.  Public  intervention  to reduce  poverty  may  be justified on ethical and political grounds.
Even in the idealized  Arrow-Debreu  world,  Pareto-efficient  solutions  achieved  by the
decentralized  market system  depend  upon the initial  allocation  of resources  among  all the actors
in society.  It would  be entirely  possible  for a Pareto-efficient  solution  to be glaringly  inequitable,
leaving some  with "too much"  and others with "too little." In most countries  the distribution  of
resources  is unacceptable,  and in some it is politically  unsustainable.  A case can be made for
public  provision  of goods  that the poor consume  relatively  more  of than  the nonpoor-that  is, for
goods  with low income  elasticity-on  grounds  of redistribution.  Some  types of health  care may
qualify.  But low income  elasticity  is not the only grounds  for government  intervention  in the
provision  of goods and services  for the poor: many  types of health and education  services,  that
have  high income  elasticity,  are provided  to the poor on grounds  of redistribution.  Moreover,
sometimes  leakage  is either  technically  inescapable  or the political  price of poverty  reduction:  to
benefit  the poor it may  be necessary  to benefit some of the nonpoor.  Nevertheless,  if poverty
reduction  is given  as a rationale  for public provision  of any good  or service,  it is often desirable
to target project benefits  towards  the poor.
Merit Goods
39.  Another  argument  for government  intervention  even in the absence  of market failures
arises from the belief that individuals  may not always  act in their own best interest,  and the
government  must intervene  to see to it that they do. Mandatory  use of seatbelts  in cars and of
helmets  for motorbikers  and mandatory  elementary  education  are examples  of a class of goods
known  as merit goods.  The  paternalistic  argument  for government  intervention  is different  from
the externalities  and information  arguments  discussed  above.  Bikers  may know  the benefits  of
wearing  helmets,  yet may continue  to ride without  them. Those  who advocate  government
intervention  believe  that it is not enough  to provide  information  and force  those who
"misbehave"  to pay for any externalities  through  taxation.  As Stiglitz  (1988) states,  "Those  who
take the paternalistic  view might argue  that individuals  should  not be allowed  to smoke,  even in
the privacy  of their own homes,  and even  if a tax, which makes  the smokers  take account  of the
external  costs imposed  on others, is levied.  This paternalistic  role undoubtedly  has been
important  in a number  of areas, such  as government  policies  toward drugs  (marijuana)  and liquor
(prohibition),  as well as compulsory  education."
40.  Using  the merit goods argument  for  justifying  government  intervention  is very delicate
and controversial.  Many  economists  believe  that no group has the right to impose  its will on
another  group.  Moreover,  they fear that special interest  groups  will attempt  to use the13
government  to further  their own  views  about how  individuals  should  act or what they should
consume.
Summary
41.  In theory,  market failures  are necessary  but not sufficient  conditions  for justifying
government  intervention  in the production  of goods  and services.  Even  in the absence  of market
failures,  there might be a case  for government  intervention  on grounds  of poverty  reduction  and
merit goods.
42.  In every case,  a case for government  intervention  must first identify  the particular
market failure  that prevents  the private  sector  from producing  the socially  optimal  quantity  of the
good or service,  second,  it must select the intervention  that will most improve  welfare,  and third,
it must show  that society  will be better off as a result of government  involvement;  that is, it must
assess  the costs and benefits  of government  involvement  and show that the benefits  will
outweigh  the costs. Table 2 lists the most common  rationales  giving  for public  intervention  and
the types of interventions  most commonly  used.
43.  It is impossible  to judge a priori  whether  or what type of government  intervention  is
appropriate  to a particular  circumstance  or even  to a class of situations.  Such  judgments are both
country-  and situation-specific  and must be made  on a case-by-case  basis. To be sure, it is easier
to make such  judgments  in the case  of the old market failures  than in the case of the new ones.
Market failures  rooted  in incomplete  markets  and imperfect  information  are pervasive:  markets
are almost always incomplete  and information  is always  imperfect.  This does not mean  that there
is always  a case for government  intervention  and that no more  analysis  is needed.  On  the
contrary,  there is a keener  need for analysis.  The welfare  consequences  of the "new market
failures" are more difficult  to measure.  Therefore,  the contribution  of government  interventions
to welfare  is likely  to be more difficult  to assess and the case for intervention  (especially
provision)  more difficult  to make.
44.  It is important  to keep in mind  that government  interventions  are often poorly  designed
and excessively  costly.  Poorly  designed  interventions  may create  market failures  of their own.
For example,  governments  concerned  about  low private investment  in high-risk  projects  may
guarantee  them against  risk, but in the process  create  problems  of moral  hazard  and induce
investors  to take no actions  to mitigate  such risks. Some interventions  may turn out to be too
costly relative  to the posited  benefits.  In seeking  to provide  extension  services,  for example,
governments  may incur  costs  that are higher  than  the benefits  received  by farmers.14
Table 2: Rationale  for and Examples  of Public  Interventions
Rationale  Examples  of Intervention
Natural monopolies  Franchise  bidding,  regulation,  provision
Externalities  Taxes  and subsidies,  regulation,  provision
Public  goods
Exclusion  difficult  Provision
Exclusion  undesirable  Subsidies,  provision
Information  failures  Regulation,  taxes and subsidies,  provision
Incomplete  markets  Provision,  taxes and subsidies,  regulation
Equity objective  Subsidies,  provision
Redistribution  Provision,  subsidies
Merit  goods  Regulation,  provision15
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